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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
TAXATION-AMENDMENTS TO THE CLIFFORD REGULATIONS
Trusts have been in existence as a device for the disposition of
property long before the impact of federal taxes, and although they
do lend themselves to tax avoidance, there is nothing inherently sus-
pect in the trust. Some realization of the bona fides of the many trust
dispositions is slowly finding recognition and is apparent in the new
Clifford Regulations.
Early legislative efforts to handle the tax avoidance problems of
trust income were based on the theory that if the grantor had the
right to get back the income or corpus, he was the owner of the
income and properly taxable thereon." This limited concept has been
greatly broadened in recent years. Since the Horst case the concept
of income ownership has been defined as the power to dispose, the
theory being that it may be more important to a wealthy grantor
to be able to designate who shall receive the income than to have
the power to collect himself. Such a concept naturally affects many
normal trust powers, such as powers of accumulation, apportionment,
and encroachment. The Clifford case3 further broadened the concept
of income ownership by including the factors of retained adminis
trative control and temporary short term disposition. This broaden-
ing of the legislative concepts of I.R.C. Sections 166 and 167 was
achieved by judicial interpretation of I.R.C. Section 22(a) which
actually says little or nothing on the subject.
In the Clifford case the grantor irrevocably transferred certain
property to himself as trustee for five years, with income payable
to his wife. The trust corpus was to revert to the grantor on termina-
tion of the trust. During the trust term the grantor had broad ad-
ministrative powers and could pay out the income to his wife or
accumulate the income for her benefit. Under these facts the grantor
was held to be the owner of the trust income. In determining this
ownership, the Supreme Court applied a combination of the three
following factors: short duration of the trust, allocation of the income
within an intimate family group and substantial administrative controls
in the grantor. Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized this combination of
factors approach by stating in his decision, "Our point here is that
no one factor is normally decisive but that all considerations and cir-
cumstances of the kind we have mentioned are relevant to the question
of ownership . . ." 4
After many decisions in which the courts attempted to apply the
Clifford doctrine, the Commissioner entered the picture and did some
ISec. 166 and 167, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended.
2 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112. 85 L Ed. 75. 61 S.Ct. 144, (1941).
3 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 84 L.Ed. 788, 60 S.Ct. 139, (1940).
4 Ibid., 309 U.S. at p. 336.
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legislating of his own in the form of the Clifford Regulations. In
attempting to set up more definite standards, the Commissioner at
first blush appears not to have considered the fact that tfie Clifford
decision was based upon a combination of factors. The Regulations
gave independent significance to three grounds, any one of which
would suffice to tax the grantor on the trust income. Only two of
these, short duration of the trust and administrative powers in the
grantor, were derived from the Clifford case. The third ground, power
to control enjoyment of the trust income, is traceable directly to the
Horst case.6 The element of the "intimate family group",7 one of the
prime factors used by the Supreme Court, was disregarded in the
Regulations.
No definite theory of taxation seems to have been followed by the
Commissioner in the Regulations. When it is remembered that the
essential problem is one of ownership, the approach of the Com-
missioner seems almost undirected by basic theory and presents a
multitude of conditions, circumstances and factual situations under
which the grantor is held to be the owner of the trust income. Out
of the intricate maze of the original Regulations one truth clearly
appeared: the Regulations did not allow sufficient flexibility for normal
trust operation. Grantors contemplating a trust found it necessary
to weigh the tax avoidance possibilities against those things which,
though essential to a trust, would result in taxation under the Regu-
lations.
This situation has been remedied somewhat by the recent amend-
ments to the Clifford Regulations." It is impossible to discuss these
new Regulations by accurate generalities and any attempt to discuss
them in detail requires almost a reprint of the actual changes them-
selves. Only general observations are attempted here. All of the
changes made by the Commissioner would seem to benefit the tax-
payer, by allowing for broader administrative powers and greater
flexibility in the management of family trusts.
5 Regulations 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-21, as added by Treasury Decision 5488, (Dec.
29. 1945). Prentce-Hall Federal Tax Service, Par. 15, 312. Commerce Clear-
ing House Tax Service, Par. 86A. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation,
Vol. 6, Sec. 37.17. 1947 Cumulative Supplement. Guterman, "The New Clifford
Reeulations." 1 Tax L.R. 379, (1946). Smith, "How the New Regulations
Affect the Clifford Case," 24 Tax Mag. 624, (1946).
6 See supra, note 2.
7 "Wehave at best a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family
group. Since the income remains in the family and since the husband retains
control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust
vill not affect any substantial change in his economic position." Helvering v.
Clifford. 309 U.S. 331, p. 335.
8 Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-21, as amended by T.D. 5567, (June 30, 1947) ; P-H
Par. 15, 312; CCH Par. 86A.
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REVERSIONARY INTEREST AFTER A SHORT TERM
Under the original Regulations the income of a trust with a dura-
tion of ten years or less was automatically taxable to the grantor
and the income of trusts with a duration from ten to fifteen years
was taxable to the grantor if he or his spouse held designated ad-
ministrative powers." In determining the duration of the trust the
Regulations provided that if the corpus of a trust was to return to
the grantor on the death of a person whose life expectancy was less
than ten years (or fifteen as the case might be) then it was within
the taxable range.10
The new amendments provide that a trust created to last for the
life of an income beneficiary is not taxable, regardless of life ex-
pectancy. This change seems beneficial to the taxpayer and may foster
the creation of "grandmother trusts", provided always that she is
an income beneficiary in some amount. The amended regulations also
allow the spouse of the grantor, if she has a substantial adverse in-
terest, to hold the designated administrative powers in a ten to fif-
teen year trust, which if held by the grantor would render him tax-
able. Apparently if the grantor held such powers conjunctively" with
his spouse having a substantial adverse interest he would nonetheless
be taxable.
POWERS To CONTROL BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT OF INCOME OR CORPUS
The original Regulations subjected the independent trustee to the
same restrictions as a grantor-trustee regarding the powers to accumu-
late income and encroach upon the corpus.' 2 The only concession made
to the independent trustee was the power to apportion income sub-
ject to some reasonably definite external standard susceptible of en-
forcement by a court of equity.
9 "A power to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities, a power to
control the investment of the trust funds either by directing investments or re-
investments or by vetoing proposed investments or reinvestments, and a power
to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property, whether or not of
an equivalent value." Reg. 111, 29.22(a)-21 (c) (2).
10 The original Regulations included the following example: "For example, a
grantor is taxable on the income of a trust if the corpus is to return to him or
his estate on the death of a person whose life expectancy is six years at the
date of the transfer in trust." Reg. 111, 29.22(a)-21 (c).
11 "if one or more of the following powers of administration . . . are exercisable
solely by the grantor, or spouse . . . not having a substantial adverse interest
... or both . . ." Reg. 111, 29.22(a)-21(c). Compare with "Where the power
to revest in the grantor . . . is vested in the grantor, either alone or in con-
junction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest . . ." I.R.C.
Sec. 166(1).
12 The original Regulations did not tax a power to accumulate for a current
income beneficiary, provided the income was ultimately payable to such bene-
ficiary. A power to pay out corpus was not taxable if the power was subject to
an external standard or if the amount paid was chargeable against the bene-
ficiary's share of the corpus. Sec. 29.22(a)-21(d) (3), (4).
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Under the amended Regulations, the independent trustee is free
to exercise unlimited powers to accumulate, encroach and apportion.'
3
This appears to be an important concession to our trust companies,
adding the advantage of tax insulation to their other trust services.
Other trustees,14 including the grantor, may enjoy the power to ac-
cumulate if the accumulated income is ultimately payable to the
beneficiary, or his appointees under an unrestricted power of appoint-
ment. This power of appointment would seem to be limited to a
power such as would be taxable under I.R.C. 811(f) of the estate
tax. Other trustees may enjoy the power to pay out corpus to the
current income beneficiary if it is ultimately chargeable against his
share of the trust, or if such power is limited by a reasonably definite
external standard.' 5 Corpus may now be paid out to remaindermen
if limited by an external standard. Income may be apportioned among
a class of beneficiaries by a trustee other than the grantor or his spouse,
if the power is limited by an external standard." Requirements for
an external standard have been eased and the standard need not be
susceptible of enforcement by a court of equity as was required in the
old Regulations.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
One of the major factors making for taxability under the Clifford
case was the broad administratve powers held by the grantor as
trustee. The original Regulations' provided for certain broad ad-
ministrative powers which could be held by any person (including the
grantor) in a fiduciary capacity.' 7 The holding of such powers as a
trustee was presumed to be fiduciary. A further concession is now
made by the new Regulations by eliminating the presumption that
such powers held by any person other than a trustee are held in a
non-fiduciary capacity. This places upon the Commissioner the bur-
den of showing more than the mere possession of administrative
powers by a non-trustee.
Borrowing from the trust corpus or income by the grantor is now
possible, if security and interest are adequate,' 8 but it will still be
13 The amended Regulations define an indpendent trustee as: "a trustee or trus-
tees, none of whom is the grantor, spouse living with the grantor, or a related
or subordinate trustee..." Sec. 29.22 (a) -21(d) (3), as amended by T.D. 5567,
(June 30, 1947).
14 The amendments go into detail describing the various classes of persons who
may hold these powers, but after analysis it would seem that the list is unre-
stricted and includes everyone except the independent trustee. Sec. 29.22(a)-21
(d) (4), as amended by T.D. 5567, (June 30, 1947).
15 Sec. 29.22(a)-21 (d) (4) (aa), (bb), as amended by T.D. 5567.
16 Ibid., (d) (4) (ee).
17 See supra, note 9.
18 The original Regulations provided that a grantor could not borrow from the
trust income or corpus, "whether with or without adequate security or interest."
Sec. 29.22(a)-21 (e) (2).
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necessary to repay the loan within the tax year as was previously
provided. An exception in the amended Regulations 19 allows an inde-
pendent trustee to loan to the grantor without adequate security, if
he is authorized under a general lending power to make loans generally
to other persons as well, upon the same terms.
In general the amendments to the Clifford Regulations offer relief
to the taxpayer and remove some of the more bothersome restrictions
which have hampered the creation of trusts and trust operation.
RICHARD D. YOUNGER
19 Ibid.
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